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Abstract
The Covid-19 pandemic disrupted “normal” modes of public sphere functioning and 
activated an experimental mode of coping, reinventing forms of publicness and com-
municative exchanges. We conceptualize the social responses triggered by the crisis as 
particular forms of public sphere resilience and assess the role of digitalisation and digi-
tal spaces in the emergence of distinct modes and dynamics of resilience. Four areas of 
enhanced public sphere experimentation are the basis of our conceptualisation: political 
consumerism, digital modes of solidarity, political protest mobilisation, and news con-
sumption. We discuss overarching features of public sphere resilience across societal 
sub-spheres and highlight the dynamics and hybridities which structure the emerging 
public spaces. Resilience practices are accompanied by dynamics of politicisation and 
depoliticisation coupled with shifting boundaries of publicness and privateness. Our 
observations likewise reveal the dynamic interplay between resilience and resistance.
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1. The Crisis as a Catalyst for (New 
Forms of) Digital Public Spheres
The Covid-19 pandemic of spring 2020 led within a very short time to a halt of our so-
cial life. Public spaces had been closed off for physical encounters, analogue social and 
professional relationships were restricted to a minimum and most people were forced 
to retreat to the privacy and intimacy of their family relationships. It would however 
be erroneous to assume that the Corona crisis simply suspended public life. Instead, 
it disrupted and redirected it. While part of the available infrastructure of the public 
sphere for physical gatherings and participation did not work anymore, the crisis also 
brought along a great need to inform, to communicate, to coordinate and make decisi-
ons – both with respect to “private” and “public” life. The standstill of public life and 
the forced retreat to privacy were further combined with an acceleration of the spread 
of news and the intensification of news consumption. On the one hand, access to news 
was crucial to gain information for survival and to escape isolation. On the other hand, 
the steady flow of negative news increased uncertainty and enhanced fears.
The Covid-19 crisis can, in this sense, be said to disrupt “normal” modes of public 
sphere functioning in the form of providing audiences with reliable and necessary in-
formation, giving them orientation and facilitating participation in public life. In this 
normal mode, the public sphere functions as an “uncertainty reducing mechanism.” 
Knowledge is accumulated, shared and channelled in a way to facilitate informed pu-
blic opinion and will formation. In the exceptional mode under the Corona pandemic, 
public spheres need to function under conditions of enhanced uncertainty: knowledge 
is not (yet) available, orientation is lost and information that can be used for political 
participation is largely unreliable and/or can be contested.
This paper deals with the question how the Covid-19 health crisis has impacted on the 
public sphere.  Our main argument is that the kind of social responses triggered by the 
Covid-19 pandemic will not simply intensify existing trends of public sphere disrup-
tions but has provoked particular forms of public sphere resilience. Instead of social 
disorder or normlessness, the public sphere during the forced isolation of its actors 
rather bounced back and activated an experimental mode of coping, reinventing forms 
of publicness and engaging in communicative exchanges as an escape from stand-
still and from imposed privacy. If physical places are closed down, the virtual public 
sphere (and hasn’t the modern public sphere always been virtual?) not only continues, 
but even intensifies its dynamic exchanges and engages in new practices. Such an in-
tensification of our virtual encounters is made possible, above all, through the creative 
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use of digital media technologies. Digital spaces become more important in response 
to both the inaccessibility of shared physical spaces and the overburdening of the tra-
ditional news space paired with an abundance of negativity and uncertainty. That is, 
the “chaos” and breakdown of some infrastructures leads to a rise in experimentation 
with and use of digital infrastructures in order to cope with emerging problems in the 
public and private realm.
The potential of digitalisation to foster the resilience of public spheres in response to 
crisis shall be investigated in this paper. We will discuss three dimensions of the public 
sphere under the pandemic and pose three interrelated research questions:
Modes of functioning of the public sphere: How do public spheres and the relevant 
actors and publics switch from routine to emergency mode in response to this crisis? 
How do digital media support or undermine such shifts?
Resilience: What is the role of digital spaces during the pandemic? How do digital 
media meet fundamental needs of users and in the crisis enhance their capacities to 
survive and/or reduce their uncertainties?
Resistance: When and how does resilience become political, i.e. is linked to the con-
testation of political choices and government? How are resilience practices translated 
into forms of political action and what is the role of digital media in facilitating this 
political mobilisation?
We will discuss the switch from routine modes of public debate to experimental modes 
of public sphere resilience in relation to four cases: political consumerism, neighbour-
hood solidarity, political mobilisation and news consumption. As we will be able to 
show, resilience, in all four cases, is triggered as a response to enhanced uncertainty, 
when routine ways of communication are (temporarily) unavailable and existing ca-
pacities of the public sphere to provide knowledge and information and to give orien-
tation become insufficient or even collapse. We will collect evidence for each case of 
how established routines of communication became disrupted/dysfunctional and how 
new experimental modes were introduced to respond to the inadequacy of existing 
public sphere infrastructure. We will further collect examples for the creative use of di-
gital media technologies to maintain public communication and cope with uncertainty. 
Resilience results from such an individual or collective engagement in public sphere 
experiments.
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2. Public Sphere Transformations 
During the Pandemic
2.1. Public Spheres vs. Public Space
Restrictions of access and of activities as they applied during Corona lockdowns, such 
as those preventing political rallies, are rather high barriers for the unfolding of public 
sphere dynamics. Urban spaces become a public sphere in the important sense that they 
allow individuals to leave their private households for public affairs. Such escapes from 
privateness into publicness are however not simply facilitated by physical movement 
(leaving the private space and entering the public) but through the use of the media. The 
lockdown of physical spaces of encounter can therefore leave the core of the modern 
public sphere, which is not so much a space to assemble, but an open communication 
system for the unfolding of discourse among anonymous members of the public (Neid-
hardt 1994), intact. Such a (by default) virtual sphere of communicative exchanges 
among strangers is not immediately affected by the lockdown of local spaces of encoun-
ters. To the contrary, it might be even enhanced. Anonymous exchanges might intensify, 
if private or semi-private relationships are closed. We are interested here however not 
so much in the possibilities for a physical escape from private to public but in how the 
conditions for an escape into publicness were also set by the creative use of digital 
media. Such creative uses are not simply linked to virtual exchanges protected by the 
anonymity of mass communication, but often include possibilities for “real encoun-
ters” as well as assemblies. The way people “gather” through the use of digital media 
thus combines all levels of publicness: semi-private encounters, purposefully organised 
groups, more loosely organised online communities and anonymous mass publics with 
often floating transitions between the different levels of organisation.
It further needs to be clarified that new public spaces as they might be facilitated 
through the use of digital media in a situation of societal lockdown are not to be ta-
ken as a new public sphere as long as they do not embrace the normative dimension 
that distinguishes the modern public sphere of democracy. As rightly pointed out by 
Papacharissi (2002, 11) online exchanges as facilitated in cyberspace provide new 
public spaces, but do not necessarily open up a new type of public sphere. Necessary 
elements for understanding digital spaces as public spheres are (1) their structural 
openness for participation; (2) that the communication enables the (self-)observation 
of society through transparency, orientation and validation of public discourse; and 
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(3) that some ideal of democracy is recognised through public debate of equal access, 
inclusion and self-determination of speakers. The question thus is how during the crisis 
publicness is sustained and promoted by digital media use and how the ideals of the 
public sphere are embraced by these practices.
2.2. Resilience
Resilience in the social sciences has been defined as “bouncing back” of individuals 
or collectives in a situation of distress or emergency (Birkland 2016; Aguirre 2006). 
It is an adaptive response to the unexpected effects of disaster or crisis after they have 
become manifest. As such, it is related to the capacities of organisations, collectives 
or individuals to face and to master a single or a series of disruptive events (crises) 
through the use of their own resources.
A strategy of resilience requires reliance on experience with adverse consequences once 
they occur in order to develop a capacity to learn from the harm and bounce back. Resi-
lience, therefore, requires the accumulation of large amounts of generalizable resources, 
such as organisational capacity, knowledge, wealth, energy, and communication, that 
can be used to craft solutions to problems that the people involved did not know would 
occur. Thus, a strategy of resilience requires much less predictive capacity but much 
more growth, not only in wealth but also in knowledge (Wildavsky 1988, 77).
To talk of resilience of the public sphere relates to new experimental modes of pu-
blicness, reinventing forms and engaging in practices of publicness as an escape from 
standstill but also from imposed privacy. Within the field of public sphere and civil 
society, we are particularly interested in the possibility of “citizens’ resilience” relating 
to a broad range of social practices of coping with crisis that are developed through 
private initiatives (though variously linked to state, local government or enterprises). 
Citizens’ resilience is linked to collective practices that are incremental and cannot be 
planned, strategically employed or steered. As such, resilience needs to be distinguis-
hed from resistance, which is manifested in the active mobilisation, non-compliance 
or civil disobedience of particular groups which drive for social change instead of 
restoration. Social movement scholars therefore typically link resistance to disadvan-
tageous groups (Bieler 2011), while resilience is primarily used by those groups who 
wish to maintain the status quo or re-establish previous order. We will see, however 
that citizens’ resilience to crisis can comprise both adaptation and contention. Citizens’ 
resilience is also not necessarily reduced to the dimension of “bouncing back” and 
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re-establishing lost stability, but also opens opportunities for “bouncing forward” and 
gaining through the development of new skills and capabilities.
Public sphere scholars are typically interested in forms of resistance and contenti-
ous politics, and not resilience, which is often considered to be linked to private and 
non-political activities. Against this, we wish to bring in citizens’ resilience as a neg-
lected field of public sphere research. Our argumentation focuses on examples for 
practices of resilience that are constitutive to public sphere dynamics. Thus, resilience 
and resistance are not simply antonyms, but can be seen as complementary, e.g. in the 
local initiatives which combine first aid with a voice for the protection of minorities 
and vulnerable groups. Thus, we combine our discussion of resilience practices with a 
consideration of resistance actions, and possible transitions from resilience to resistan-
ce. Citizens’ resilience can have a political intention but does not need to. This implies 
that not all forms of resilience developed by citizens necessarily aim at a recovery of 
the public sphere. Resilience practices can unfold in the private or be restricted to mar-
ket activities. We would, for instance, expect that many practices of resilience in res-
ponse to Covid-19 are primarily targeted at recovery of personal well-being or survival 
in the market. However, experimental modes of publicness often encompass private 
and public life and bridge economic and political activities. As such, they can also be 
applied to more explicit forms of contentious action. Resilience here manifests itself 
in those practices in which collective action does not primarily aim at overcoming 
pandemic induced negative effects on personal life but responds to the Covid-chan-
ged environment and possibilities for mobilisation with adaptation and relocation of 
pre-existing movements. In terms of more specific modes of resilience, adaptation 
relates to those forms of activism which were still possible in public spaces, even un-
der the restricted circumstances (for instance, street protests by maintaining distance). 
Relocation, meanwhile, refers to the transfer of contentious politics to digital public 
spheres as a response to the crisis-imposed closure of physical space, or to hybrid va-
riants of online and offline mobilisation. It is paramount to differentiate those forms 
of resilience in response to the inaccessibility of public spheres as such from forms of 
resistance in response to the crisis and its management.
2.3. Digital Affordances
The health crisis has been another push factor of digitalisation at a global scale and in 
almost every aspects of our lives. Thus, with the availability and the affordances of di-
gital information and platform technology, social media communication platforms and 
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microblogging, the smartification of everyday life, the penetration of artificial intelli-
gence and deep learning solutions in connection with network technology, the global 
health crisis has triggered a boost of technological change at a degree never seen be-
fore. Thus, neither the technological change nor the social consequences of the health 
crisis can be assessed without relating them to the affordances of digitalisation.
Digital affordances facilitate a new form of publicness in response to the global health 
crisis, which consists in mutual observation and comparison of societies across the 
globe. This encompasses comparison of the development (or the neglect thereof) of 
digital affordances and solutions. Countries which have been lagging behind in the 
development of their digital infrastructure are suddenly confronted with their defi-
cits of technological advancement. Holding up a mirror in Europe, comparisons with 
countries in South East Asia such as China or South Korea demonstrate that European 
countries have a lot to catch up. At the same time the social, political and economic 
structures are operating differently in Europe and require different solutions. The rapid 
information flows which were enabled by digital media and platforms also triggered 
processes of mutual observation between countries or between different regions within 
a country. The standstill and restrictions to fundamental rights of movement or free-
dom of assembly have been legitimised by pointing at the pictures and policies of other 
countries. Such an enhancement of publicness through mutual observation can be seen 
as a response to the fact that the pandemic affected regions and local communities 
differently, as some regions turned into hotspots while others remained less affected.
The global health crisis pushed digitalisation into various areas of the life world and 
enhanced technological change in sectors that were previously dominated by assembly 
publics. With the lockdown and the closing of kindergartens, schools and institutions 
of higher education, the access and availability of digital media have suddenly become 
essential tools of social exchange in civil society as well as in family and business. The 
shutdown of production and service industries provoked people’s lockdown in their 
homes, meaning their work could only be upheld through personal computers, digital 
equipment and security software. As shops and public services closed down, digital 
devices, smartphone apps and computers kept the service industry alive and boosted 
e-business and shopping. With social distancing and restrictive rules of staying home, 
social media and platforms of meeting, blogging and messaging (such as WhatsApp, 
Instagram, Facebook and Twitter and many more) provided the most basic functions 
of communication and social relations between families, friends and neighbours. The 
same devices were used by governments to inform their people about the state of the 
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crisis on a daily basis. During the health crisis, digitalisation was the backbone for 
upholding the most fundamental functioning of politics, culture and society.
The social consequences of digitalisation in the Covid-19 pandemic must not be inter-
preted in a deterministic way but need to be understood in how they reciprocate with 
their users. The appropriation of digital affordances eventually provoked contradictory 
developments and pointed to tensions in coping with the social and political conse-
quences of the crisis. On the one hand, digitalisation unleashed enormous potentials 
of innovation (e.g. the Corona Dashboard of Avi Schiffmann) as the crisis came with 
an enormous need for information and for coping with essential threats of health and 
wellbeing (on the individual and societal level). Creativity went into the invention 
of new applications which were possible through the harvesting of (health) data. On 
the other hand, the example of China showed digital tools to cope with the situation 
include surveillance, political control and further restrictions of individual freedom 
and rights. It is in this tension between innovation and control that public space and 
eventually public sphere evolves and provokes practices of resilience and resistance 
that are acted out with digital media.
We will discuss the practices of resilience and the use of digital affordances as they 
relate to changes in the public sphere in three different sectors of society, namely the 
economy, civil society and the media. Moreover, we believe that the dynamics of resi-
lience as a response to the crisis might be best observed in local spaces and neighbour-
hoods. In cities like Berlin for instance, the local neighbourhood in the urban centre 
with all its social functions is called a “Kiez”. The Kiez denotes a particular milieu 
which includes a lifestyle that is informal, creative and open since it lives through the 
interaction of an established neighbourhood with strangers such as visitors or tourists 
(Till 2005). Most importantly, the Kiez already builds on informal networks that link 
to other (local and global) spaces and thus invites translocal encounters.
The case of the Kiez demonstrates that resilience should be treated as a reaction to the 
experience of closure of a space that is meant to be principally open. The local neig-
hbourhood is the last resort when larger societal spaces (for instance, spaces of work, 
of trade or of travel) have become inaccessible. Even a visit in another neighbourhood 
has to be justified, and remote places for travel are out of reach. Freedom of move-
ment is indeed factually restricted to the local neighbourhood. At the same time the 
pandemic disrupts the relationship between the “space of places” (physical, local, ter-
ritorialised) and the “space of flows” (digital, global, networked) which characterises 
modern urban life (Castells 2005). The space of places had already been undergoing a 
process of fragmentation, disconnecting physically proximate urban locales from one 
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another, and yet pandemic restrictions intensify this process of fragmentation by ma-
king travel outside the neighbourhood unit impossible in most cases. Meanwhile (as 
we have argued with respect to digital affordances already) simultaneous restrictions 
across the world forcing people to stay at home drive global increases in digital com-
munication uses, and therefore an intensification of the space of flows as networked 
and deterritorialised. Finally, the routinised ways in which the space of flows is “folded 
into” (Castells 2005, 51) the space of places is again disrupted by new barriers to the 
use of public areas.
3. Practices of Resilience
The ways digitalisation can support resilience through the activation of experimental 
modes of publicness varies widely depending on different needs to be satisfied in dif-
ferent areas of life. In the following, we select four areas where experimental modes of 
publicness develop in response to the enhanced uncertainty of the pandemic: political 
consumerism, neighbourhood solidarity, political mobilisation, and news consump-
tion. In these areas we identify opportunities for citizens to maintain access to some 
version of public life in the crisis. And we observe shared practices of experimental 
coping using the potentials of digitalisation.
3.1. Digital Communication and Political 
Consumerism
At the same time as citizens experienced the closure of many public spaces, the crisis 
politicised economic life. Governments regulated businesses in extraordinary ways 
to achieve public health outcomes, causing precipitous drops in overall consumption. 
The consequences of these interventions, such as job losses and economic recession, 
also became the focus of intense public discussion. For our argument, however, we are 
more interested in how citizen participation in economic life during the pandemic was 
politicised in new and creative ways.
Even before the pandemic, political consumerism was one of the most common forms 
of political participation in many countries, enabling citizens to achieve political goals 
through consumer choices (Micheletti, Follesdal, and Stolle 2003). Research has 
distinguished between different varieties of political consumerism, and in particular 
between punishment-oriented boycotts and reward-oriented “buycotts,” which have 
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different strategic goals, normative orientations (Copeland 2014) and patterns of in-
formation consumption (Kelm and Dohle 2018). Varieties of political consumerism 
have already been related to broader strategies of resistance and resilience, such as the 
Greek responses to austerity (Lekakis 2017).
In the pandemic, there were plentiful grievances against corporate actors which ac-
ted as potential catalysts for resistance. For example, while a large majority of the 
US public believed companies should provide 14 days of paid sick leave, less than a 
third of the country’s largest companies made such policy changes during the initial 
months of the crisis.1 Yet the possibilities to stage resistance through boycotts faced 
new barriers. Primarily, uncertainty about the future of the economy made the calcu-
lation of punishment by consumers difficult.  After all, when and how should citizens 
ostracise businesses in individual cases, when their governments were spending public 
money to prevent the failure of businesses in general? During the height of the pande-
mic, then, political consumption as resistance was to some degree suspended. One UK 
newspaper even explicitly referenced the deferral of this resistance with a list of “[t]
he companies people are vowing to boycott after the coronavirus pandemic is over.”2
During the height of the crisis political consumerism moved away from boycott and 
shifted its focus towards resilience and survival. This change had a material compo-
nent - i.e. individuals changing their purchasing decisions - but more important here 
is its discursive component, where digital communications enable opinion formation 
about market practices.
The radical reduction in consumption prompted greater debate about consumption it-
self - what Stolle and Micheletti (2013) refer to as lifestyle political consumerism. 
News organisations reported on drastic improvements of air quality in major cities, 
and a Twitter post appearing to show swans returning to the unusually clear canals 
in Venice received almost one million likes, and helped to drive a (frequently ironic) 
viral meme trend around the phrase ‘Nature is healing. We are the virus.’ In part, then, 
resilience during the crisis involved a mode of experimental withdrawal from econo-
mic life: since people were being forced to limit their usual patterns of consumption 
anyway, they began imagining the potentialities of this kind of withdrawal in social 
and environmental terms.
1 https://justcapital.com/reports/survey-what-americans-want-from-corporate-america-during-the-re-
sponse-reopening-and-reset-phases-of-the-coronavirus-crisis/
2 https://metro.co.uk/2020/03/26/companies-people-vowing-boycott-coronavirus-pandem-
ic-12460345/
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When citizens did engage in active consumption, other forms of resilience were ena-
bled through the adaptation of practices to the changed environment. In particular, 
local and small businesses gained new salience as the target of buycotts in direct res-
ponse to threats to their survival, enabled by digital platforms such as Twitter hashtags 
specific to particular cities and regions. Platforms themselves adapted to increasing 
demand for this form of discursive political consumerism, such as the new Instagram 
sticker “Support Small Business” which then created an additional story comprised of 
all posts using the sticker across the user’s followed accounts. Instagram suggesting 
at the time that these kinds of digital affordances could be used to adapt to the loss in 
local public space, saying “many stores remain closed and social media serves as an 
online Main Street”.3
In other cases, resilience can be observed in the relocation of political consumerism to 
newly created digital spaces, often through bottom-up initiatives responding directly 
to the heightened risk. One example of this kind of bottom-up initiative is the website 
“Support Local or Else” (SLoE), which was created by local business owners in the US 
city of Charlotte, North Carolina. The SLoE website offers itself as an online directory 
where small businesses can advertise concrete ways for individuals to support them, 
such as buying gift cards to redeem after the pandemic restrictions are lifted. Import-
antly, the concrete buycotting acts are situated within a wider ranging discourse poli-
ticising the intersection between markets and urban life: the homepage states, “small 
businesses empower the creativity, passion and community that make our city thrive” 
and calls on people to “Do your part. Support local.” In this way small businesses 
which are usually connected by shared locality are instead relocated to newly created 
digital spaces, which cohere around the political significance of markets for urban life.
It remains to be seen whether these kinds of initiatives exist only as short-term symbo-
lic reactions to the pandemic, or if they hold the potential for more substantial transfor-
mations in consumerism. There are early indications, however, that experiments with 
resilience can support wider ranging action into the future. For example, the SLoE 
website initially focused solely on small businesses affected by the health crisis. After 
the murder of George Floyd by police officers in the US and the subsequent protests 
around racial injustice, the SLoE website then added a directory for Black-owned 
businesses. We can observe a discourse of political consumerism which began with a 
narrow focus on survival in response to the crisis, and yet naturally accommodated a 
more expansive politicisation of economic life as the crisis developed.
3 https://www.facebook.com/business/news/helping-people-and-businesses-find-their-online-main-
street
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3.2. Resilience as Acts of Solidarity
The closure of offline spaces during the first weeks of the Covid pandemic created a 
need for solidarity with vulnerable groups, which were exposed to the high risks of 
health, social isolation or economic loss. At the same time, the inaccessibility of offline 
spaces became an obstacle for the mobilisation of solidarity action. Solidarity became 
one of the buzzwords in the Covid pandemic, yet, while solidarity traditionally implies 
a move to overcome social distance, its new meaning was associated with “social 
distancing”. This required the need to redefine and reinvent solidarity in online digital 
spaces. We can observe new modes of digital resilience being practised to mitigate 
the effects of the crisis, either through adaptation of existing practises, such as seen in 
the intensification in the use of existing digital platforms, or through the relocation of 
action to digital space, such as exemplified by the creation of new digital spaces for 
crisis-related needs. Digital resilience can also involve forms of politicisation when 
spaces beforehand used for private exchanges become more strongly related to forms 
of public claims-making and contestation about solidarity as a shared concern that 
requires common efforts among society at large.
One example of how such an intensification in platform use goes hand in hand with 
the politicisation of solidarity is Nebenan.de. Solidarity and neighbourly help in local 
areas have long been promoted through digital platforms that contribute to exchange 
(and maybe sometimes encounter publics) in physical space by enabling meetings in 
digital space. The platform, which started in 2015 in Germany and exists now also in 
France, Spain, and Italy, is a digital meeting place at the local level (with 1.4 million 
users in Germany) and connects primarily individuals (but also businesses and orga-
nisations) in a local neighbourhood. Members of a local community can get in contact 
with their neighbours via posting publicly, in sub-forums and groups, or by messaging 
other members individually. Before the Corona pandemic the platform was primarily a 
digital space of encounter, mutual support and private exchange, such as helping each 
other out through lending items.
With the Corona pandemic and the inaccessibility of public space we see an intensifi-
cation in platform use that goes hand in hand with its politicization. Members on the 
platform and the platforms’ operators called for action to support the local neighbour-
hood. Neighbourhood concerns were thus exported and claimed to be “shared con-
cerns” to be dealt with collectively. Neighbourhood solidarity against Corona became 
a public issue. This relates to individual support – people in search for help related 
to the pandemic could fill out a help request form – but also to organisations such as 
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local businesses. The platform initiated an appeal for donations via Kaufnebenan.de, 
where one can donate or buy a voucher for small businesses of one’s own choice to 
support them in Corona times. This is an example of resilience of local publics who 
reappropriate an existing digital space in a more intense, more political, and less pri-
vate form. At the same time, the platform connects back to offline communication as 
it established a phone hotline to be accessible for those most vulnerable who are not 
able to connect digitally during the pandemic. Thus, the turn to digital affordances in 
the immediate first phase of the pandemic is supplemented by offline communication, 
as digital communication can fall short of being inclusionary.
One example of relocation of action to the digital space is the platform Unitedwest-
ream.berlin, a newly created public space that extends beyond the local. It has been 
initiated by a diverse set of actors (Club Commission, Reclaim Club Culture, Berlin 
Worx, in cooperation with rbb and ARTE concert) in March 2020 to help venues and 
artists affected by the lockdown. The platform streams a range of events such as music, 
discussion rounds and lectures, taking place in Berlin venues as well as in other cities 
such as Munich, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Vienna and Leipzig. The offers are free and ac-
cessible for everyone, but users are asked to donate to a rescue fund for event locations 
and for political purposes (Zivile Seenotrettung). While cultural spaces in general per-
tain more to private life, recreation and fun, they oftentimes also stand for the linkage 
between private concerns and the public matters. With the closure of those spaces, acts 
of solidarity evolved, which go beyond pure monetary support. Instead the question is 
addressed in which society – with which cultural institutions and offers – people would 
like to live in the future. Thus, caring for the survival of a cultural environment in the 
crisis becomes an act of civic intervention and the digital spaces created to support 
these actions fulfil a political function. However, it is uncertain to what extent those 
acts of resilience are sustainable in the medium and long run.
3.3. Resilience and Resistance through Political 
Mobilisation
During the Covid pandemic the transition from (local) resilience to resistance goes 
hand in hand with the politicisation of public spaces. Public assemblies and street mo-
bilisation for rallies, protests, and mass demonstrations belong to fundamental human 
rights and are prime examples how offline public spheres enable political participation 
and collective public opinion formation. The recent decade saw mass movements and 
demonstrations in many parts of the world, ranging from the transnational student 
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movement Fridays for Future to fight against climate change (Wahlström et al. 2019), 
demonstrations against EU migration policies (Seebrücke) in European countries, or 
massive pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Although online social media provi-
ded an important information and coordination channel for all those collective actions, 
their main venue were the streets and physical places across the globe. All those mobili-
sations and public assemblies have come to an abrupt halt, with governments imposing 
legal mechanisms to slow down the pandemic’s spread, including total prohibition of 
public assembling in the first acute phase of the crisis. Restrictions of the right to as-
semble in the subsequent phase were enforced by requirements of practicing physical 
distancing. Routines of mobilisation were not only disrupted by the strict limitations to 
mobilise on the streets and reduced opportunities to do so by, for example, face-to-face 
encounters (della Porta 2020). They were also held back by uncertainty, and concern 
about what the pandemic would mean for individual life and how opposing regulatory 
measures would put ones own health at risk. In this respect, the first acute phase of 
the crisis can be described as external shock, which seems to have almost completely 
stopped mobilisations at a first – short – point in time. Protest activities dramatically 
decreased across the world.4 Nevertheless, after the immediate shock, experimental 
modes emerged which (1) respond to the crisis of the public sphere resulting from the 
imposed crisis regulations (blocked public spaces), and (2) react and oppose against 
the Corona pandemic narrative, framing and political actions as such. In the following 
two sections we discuss these two modes in terms of resilience and resistance.
(1) Resilience through adaptation of practises and relocation to digital public spheres
We can speak of resilience in those instances in which collective action does not target 
the pandemic issue as such, but responds to the Covid-changed environment and pos-
sibilities for mobilisation with adaptation of practices and relocation of pre-existing 
movements in space.
The pandemic has fostered the creative adaptation of those forms of activism which 
were less frequently used so far, and which ensured safety for the participants, such 
as car caravans or poster displaying actions on balconies. But action has primarily 
been relocated to digital public spheres or to hybrid variants of online and offline mo-
bilisation. This relocation reacts to the closure of physical space in an innovative and 
experimental way.  For example, the Fridays for Future movement which had used 
their website and social media channels before the crisis primarily for mobilisation and 
4 https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/03/nonviolent-action-time-coronavirus
18
information, relocated their demonstrations almost entirely online. Live-streaming-
events were the main sphere of public action in the first strict period of the pandemic. 
Those digital spaces were accompanied by innovative forms of action, such as using 
the physical space around participants’ home including their balcony, windows or their 
workplaces to locate signs or banners calling for climate change, or art actions and 
poster campaigns in front of relevant public buildings. These examples can be con-
tinued with regard to a number of protest movements that existed before the Corona 
pandemic, such as the international Seebrücke movement which fights for a different 
approach in Europe’s migration policy, and which moved their actions as of the end of 
March 2020 to an interactive online demonstration.
As restrictions of access to public spaces are relaxed in the second phase of the pan-
demic, further experimentation is evident in the return to protests in physical space. 
Some physical protests have maintained social distancing between participants, crea-
ting striking visual images of evenly spaced grids of protesters. While this is certainly 
more logistically complex, it is also for that reason a novel way to stage at least three 
elements of what Tilly (2004) would term “WUNC displays” - showcasing the wort-
hiness, unity and commitment of protesters.
In general, we observe that mobilisation in this later phase swings back from reliance on 
digital space to hybrid forms and increased relevance of public locations. Online demon-
strations require considerable technical and financial effort of the organizers and might 
face difficulties and challenges in achieving large public attention. Thus, the public space 
gets reclaimed and action repertoires adapted as soon as Covid measures allow.
(2) Resistance against the Corona pandemic narrative, framing and political actions
A second type of action spurred by the crisis is resistance against the pandemic nar-
rative and the actions imposed to fight the disease by governments across the world. 
Uncertainty is high in the Corona pandemic, reliable knowledge regarding best mea-
sures and their effects still being developed, and hard measures interfere strongly with 
individual fundamental rights. Resistance against governmental actions seems to have 
evolved only to a limited extent in the first acute phase of the crisis, but it has been 
increasing since the first shock was overcome. Governments across the globe in this 
second phase have to face demonstrations against lockdown measures and the crisis 
narrative as such.5 Given the continued uncertainty, rumours and conspiracy theories 
are proliferating (Shahsavari et al. 2020; Cinelli et al. 2020) and pose significant thre-
5 https://acleddata.com/analysis/covid-19-disorder-tracker/#1585775314361-2ee40e97-5aec
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ats to democratic institutions such as a free press but also to individual lives. Those 
acts of resistance, likewise, combine virtual protest with offline action forms which are 
adapted to the still restricted situation in innovative ways.
3.4. The Pandemic News Sphere
A global pandemic also creates a global space for the manufacture of news, its, dif-
fusion and consumption. The public sphere during the first stage of the pandemic has 
been a single issue public which focussed on Covid-19 almost entirely. Bad news in 
a situation of forced social isolation created undoubtedly unprecedented levels of di-
stress at the individual level. What type of resilience can we expect with regard to 
emerging patterns of news consumption?
The first possibility is that enhanced news consumption during the pandemic would 
enable people to build resilience capacities. In facing the new uncertainty and risks of 
the pandemic, individuals are dependent on information and will, consequently, acti-
vely seek news. According to the “uses and gratification” paradigm news is accessed to 
decrease uncertainty, find orientation and give advice in situations that are experienced 
as stressful (Blumler and Katz 1974). Many news organisations have therefore increa-
sed efforts to provide reliable information and quality news that focus on explanation 
and advice. They satisfy the essential needs of individuals who are left alone (and of-
ten in isolation) with the pandemic and answer their questions about how to behave to 
remain healthy and to reduce risks. Furthermore, the immersion in the world of news 
can offer security in the form of community bonds, affiliation and shared destiny that 
are communicated through messages like “we are all sitting in the same boat”. This 
is important for conveying some sense of solidarity that resources will be shared, and 
that crisis will be mastered by holding together as a community.
Secondly, the principled ambivalence of news consumption needs to be acknowled-
ged, which can help as well as hurt. We could expect therefore that withdrawal from 
news also manifests itself as a form of resilience. In many circumstances, news do not 
simply reduce uncertainty, they rather increase anxiety. The abundance of news, which 
in addition is monothematic and negative can create unprecedented levels of distress at 
the individual and collective level. Also, by watching news content, we will find that 
uncertainty is not necessarily reduced but also reintroduced because available know-
ledge proves insufficient, experts often contradict each other, and governmental decisi-
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ons remain contested. This again might challenge trust in established news sources and 
in journalism, and increase fears about being misinformed by the news media.
As the pandemic unfolds, we expect that practices of resilience in news consumption 
develop over time with information needs satisfied especially in the initial phase and 
saturation achieved in later weeks or people even turning away from news altogether 
or embracing increasingly “alternative” news and mis- and disinformation agendas. 
News consumption went up especially during the first weeks of Corona with people 
turning primarily to unbiased sources from news organisations, governments or health 
organisations (Nielsen et al. 2020a). News are accessed from various platforms at the 
same time, with online sources (including social media) and television as the most 
popular ways of getting news (Nielsen et al. 2020a). In Germany, the most widespread 
channels of information are public broadcasters, through TV and their news apps. A 
majority of people visit news sources from public broadcasters several times a day, 
especially through the live feeds of news apps. News articles are frequently shared 
among friends by using various applications, such as WhatsApp and similar networks 
(Viehmann, Ziegele, and Quiring 2020). According to Frischlich et al. (2020), 97% of 
all Germans reported that they used at least one mainstream professional news source 
(TV, radio, print) a week, but only 12% used alternative news sources. This indicates 
for Germany that the risk of exposure to disinformation is reduced. Only the small mi-
nority of those who primarily used alternative news sources was exposed to a higher 
risk. The same study (Frischlich et al. 2020) shows that exposure to conspiracy head-
lines was low, but encounter with Covid-19 related distorted information was higher 
(36%). This confrontation obviously also increased their awareness of the risk of mi-
sinformation. Resilience becomes relevant here as practices of news readers to prevent 
confrontation with disinformation or prevent the spread of conspiracy theories.
While misinformation and disinformation are tied to communication in social net-
works and digital platforms in particular, quality journalism and public media have 
engaged in expert talk and science communication. Thus, one of the most visible group 
of actors in public information and debate are medical experts, virologists and epide-
miologists who explain the nature of the pandemic and its consequences for public 
health. Often, they are cited as government advisors who lend credibility to the measu-
res restraining public life. Every country comes up with such experts interpreting me-
dical statistics and providing legitimisation to public policies responding to the crisis. 
Levels of trust in scientists is found to be consistently high in all European countries 
and the US and is frequently used as a resource of public information in the news but 
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also in entertainment formats such as talk shows.6 During the first months of the pan-
demic, polls from different countries indicated that trust in scientific expertise was on 
the rise and that people were more likely to listen to expert advice in the media.7 The 
debate among experts however also brings up new controversy and popularises scien-
tific debate in the life sciences which opens up news space for dubious interpretation 
and misinterpretation.
Resilience practices regarding media consumption have been discussed in relation to 
mis- and disinformation. In this context, resilience means to build some sort of im-
munity against disinformation and to restore truth orientation in public debates. The 
literature distinguishes between “cognitive resilience” and “physical resilience” (Bjola 
and Papadakis 2020). The former relates to techniques for building adequate know-
ledge and literacy that allow individual media users to recognise falsehood in such a 
way that disinformation cannot take roots. Resilience would be a kind of vaccination 
against propaganda that makes potential receivers immune. This is combined with 
“physical resilience” which needs to be designed and implemented by providers in 
their hardware and software to filter out and stop the spread of disinformation, disrup-
ting the network and disconnecting its nodes (Bjola and Papadakis 2020). These two 
forms of resilience are benchmarks for assessing the effectiveness of strategies against 
disinformation by governments.
Cognitive resilience, thus, is a way of enhancing cognitive capacities of individual 
media users and publics for reading news critically. Critical news reading goes be-
yond passive news consumption. It relates to modes of empowerment of news readers 
to handle distorted information in a competent manner (Frischlich et al. 2020). The 
common assumption is that news readers need to receive some sort of external support 
to become resilient against disinformation, for instance, the entry of media literacy 
in school curricula, or moderation on social media. While such external support is 
certainly urgently needed to help news readers to handle the potential dangers of disin-
formation, one should not underrate the capacities of individual news readers or reader 
communities to develop such resilience practices themselves.
As the pandemic continues, we witness increasing signs of the second form of resi-
lience: the withdrawal from news. News audiences in some countries have become 
increasingly polarised in their assessment of whether news media provided reliable 
and critical coverage with respect to the crisis and crisis management (for UK: Niel-
6 https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/competitiveness-report/2011/chapters/new_per-
spectives_smarter_policy_design_chapter_3.pdf
7 See the report of the Open Knowledge Foundation in the UK with fieldwork conducted on April 
27-28, 200 (https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Aicw6JyYsx_ydC6Ki_JTZyIapBk5zw56/view)
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sen, Kalogeropoulos, and Fletcher 2020b). Not only are differences in measures taken 
across countries difficult to understand first-hand, some audiences also blame news 
media for insufficient accuracy in their reporting (Cushion et al. 2020).
In the second stage of the pandemic the initial rise in news use flattened quickly, but 
again country differences matter regarding the degree to which people turn away from 
quality news. For Germany, the study of Viehmann et al. (2020) shows that the infor-
mation use after the initial peak began to decline selectively. Meaning, that between 
week one and week three of the Corona lockdown, the news of public broadcasters and 
the press kept relatively stable audience rates while alternative news sources suffered 
from audience losses up to 7 percent. For the US, the picture is bleaker, as people 
increasingly turned away from Corona related news as the pandemic lasted (Benton 
2020). According to the same study, US audiences also seem to be more vulnerable to 
misinformation and conspiracy news stories spread more easily.  Similar findings are 
reported for the UK in a study by the Reuters Institute (Kalogeropoulos, Fletcher, and 
Nielsen 2020) according to which audiences feel increasingly stressed by bad Corona 
news and negative effects on their moods and, after an initial surge, start avoiding 
news again (Kalogeropoulos, Fletcher, and Nielsen 2020, n.p.).
4. Modes and Dynamics of Resilience
The discussion of various experimental modes of publicness in economic activities, 
social exchanges in the local realm, political mobilisation and news media consump-
tion during the pandemic allows us to point to common features of resilience and 
reflect on their significance for overall public sphere dynamics. In all cases we find 
that the heightened uncertainty of the crisis provokes experimentation and innovation 
using digital affordances, which varies between the more specific modes of adaptation 
and relocation. 
The first mode of resilience is the adaptation of existing practises and action forms 
themselves in their regular space, be they local or digital. Adaptation can take the 
form of intensification of existing practices or (temporary) withdrawal from them. We 
witnessed the strengthening of action repertoires in different areas of society, such as 
the intense use of digital platforms to demonstrate solidarity (3.2) or increasing news 
consumption to cope with crisis-induced insecurity (3.4). In the course of the crisis, 
we have also observed a countermovement to intensification in various social fields. 
At specific points in times, we observe the withdrawal from action, be it in form of 
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lifestyle consumerism (3.1) or the avoidance of information which became evident 
in later stages of the crisis (3.4). Another form of adaptation of action forms to the 
new circumstances of crisis was the creative use of forms of contentious action that 
comply with Corona-imposed measures (3.3). In all these instances, existing practices 
of communication and action - offline or online - are appropriated to crisis-related 
needs. This mode of resilience has the advantage that existing structures and routines 
of communication can be adapted and expanded, profiting from prior experiences and 
participation. This makes this mode of resilience easily accessible even in situations 
of increased uncertainty.
The second mode of resilience was the relocation of action to new spaces. This in-
cluded the relocation of mobilisation action from offline places to digital spaces (3.3) 
and the entire creation of new digital spaces, be it for solidarity related actions (3.2) or 
with respect to consumer issues (3.1). This mode is more demanding, as the higher le-
vel of innovation requires higher resources and the viability and sustainability of new 
solutions to enabling publicness are less certain. Participation structures need to be 
developed beyond pre-existing structures. Available digital platforms, such as online 
news spaces (3.4) can be used for innovation but also bear the risk of deviation from 
established to “alternative news”.
Overall, resilience practices appear highly dynamic and context dependent on crisis-re-
lated and general public sphere structures. One important dynamic we observe is the 
politicisation of private and economic life: acts of solidarity and acts of consumerism 
are re-imagined as collective practises with the intent of building a sustainable and 
solidary community. As public spaces and familiar venues for public sphere dynamics 
become temporarily inaccessible, citizens seek to escape into the public through other 
means. They find new ways to politicise private spaces by making them an object of 
public discussion. This form of politicisation (Zürn 2014) which seems to be strongly 
linked to the crisis dynamic places emphasis on the intensified public salience of issues 
of collective concern. Thus, resilience in the form of politicisation emerges in the state 
and under the condition of emergency, while the longer-term consequences of these 
dynamics remain unclear after all.
Digital media foster and enable politicisation as resilience practices in moments when 
forms of actual resistance are not easily set into practice due to uncertainty and pu-
blic sphere barriers. Such resilience is primarily oriented towards survival, and less 
towards systemic change. Resilience in this sense seems less innovative than at first 
glance. However, a turning point in these forms of politicisation is reached when resi-
lience turns into resistance.
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We have argued throughout this paper that resilience as it emerged in various practi-
ces of “survival” during the pandemic should not be understood as an alternative or 
as a substitute to resistance. A societal lockdown as experienced during the pandemic 
did temporarily ban protest from the streets, but might also lay the conditions for its 
resurgence. Resilience practices as we described them as experimental modes of pu-
blicness are linked to the expression of public concerns in various ways. Resilience 
is thus to be considered as a key mechanism of the emergence of a political public 
sphere and understood in the way it raises a public agenda. It is not private action, but 
civic action facilitated by rights and creative ways of “enacting citizenship” (Isin and 
Ruppert 2015). This means that usual distinctions drawn between resilience as private, 
as reactive, and as compliance compared with resistance as public, proactive and op-
positional do not apply. Resilience is not necessarily restricted to restoration, but can 
be highly innovative. It creates solutions for society not only to survive, but to learn 
and to become more sustainable over time. Our findings therefore invite rethinking the 
relationship between resilience and resistance practices that are both constitutive to the 
public sphere and its dynamic transformation.
In the Covid-19 pandemic options of resistance were temporarily unavailable as street 
manifestations were banned during the lockdown and the mobilisation of political op-
position was marginalised. Choices for political mobilisation were also encumbered 
by fear and a high degree of uncertainty. While resistance requires higher degrees of 
certainty, approved knowledge and common orientation, resilience is an experimen-
tal mode of public sphere functioning available also under conditions of uncertainty. 
Opting for resistance during the pandemic, e.g. in the form of political protest against 
the lockdown, would require investment in strategies for reducing uncertainty. As cer-
tainties were not readily available, protest risked becoming fed by “alternative facts”, 
selected proof and evidence that were turned into political propositions.
The transformative aspects of public sphere developments during the pandemic point 
to suspensions of public life and at the same time to experimental modes which were 
politicised over time - from tentative practices of resilience in the initial phase of the 
crisis to more overt forms of protest and resistance in later stages. The reopening of 
physical spaces brings an opportunity for this politicisation to support more expansive 
forms of contentious politics. As public spheres during the pandemic have become 
more contentious, also practices of resilience develop from the initial, more experi-
mental phase to more established and sustainable solutions. Instead of considering 
resilience and resistance as linked to alternative repertoires of collective action, we 
should rather understand how they dynamically relate to each other and how partici-
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pants interpret them as collective action with political meaning. Selective processes 
apply through which resilience practices are tested out, improved, developed further 
or given up again.
The Corona pandemic and the controversial measures taken to combat it have the 
potential to trigger major political unrest. This has to do with political restrictions of 
freedom and rights, and even more so with long-term negative economic consequen-
ces. Resistance is a question of timing. The community which holds together against 
the danger of the virus, risks falling apart again, once controversial measures are taken 
or simply when impatience increases. Such a transition from resilience to resistance 
can be observed in the surge of protest back into physical public spaces in the later 
stages of the crisis. Anti-lockdown protests were discredited presuming that protesters 
were victims of disinformation campaigns or conspiracy narratives, yet many of these 
protests were also driven by serious concerns with democracy and the state of law. 
Emergency measures are by default paternalistic and can be easily experienced as 
arbitrary or even as “tyranny of the virologist” or “Coronavirus dictatorship,” as this 
has been framed by the resistance movements. The circumstances for people to start 
mobilizing should therefore not be reduced to single factors but rather understood as 
part of the dynamic interplay between resilience and resistance. Political protest was 
also back in countries hit hardest by the pandemic occupying alternative agendas of 
social justice, such as the unrest which began in the US in response to the murder 
of George Floyd and spread internationally under the banner of Black Lives Matter. 
These protests spread transnationally through ties of solidarity expressed by protesters 
in cities as diverse as Berlin, Sydney and Sao Paulo. The experimental modes which 
characterised public sphere resilience during the intense initial phase of the pandemic 
- not just the politicisation of private spaces, but also the embeddedness within digital 
communication networks and the enhanced news consumption - all create the precon-
ditions for a resurgence into physical public spaces.
This interrelation between the pandemic and subsequent waves of protest confirms our 
argument that resilience should not be viewed in isolation as a strategy of conservation 
of previously established patterns of public communication (bouncing back). Instead, 
we may consider resilience in a broader context with politicisation and resistance as an 
avenue for the transition of the public sphere (bouncing forward). In facing uncertain-
ty induced by the Covid-19 pandemic, existing templates and normative role models 
for public sphere performance do not necessarily apply. By entering an experimental 
mode, the public sphere can become an open playground for questioning standard 
distinctions such as private and public, political and non-political or also local, natio-
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nal and international. The context conditions for this to happen include digitalisation, 
which further accelerates the various patterns of new hybrid and fluid forms of pu-
blicness. However, the global health crisis has shown, that digital public spheres are 
vulnerable to short term changes in the environment and at the same time are subject 
to larger conditions of social change. This makes it highly dynamic and dissonant and 
produces unequal conditions of coping. On the one hand, digital publics can build 
on the previous experiences of some users who have been socialised within this new 
environment of hybrid media and fluid communication modes. On the other hand, 
the global health crisis takes place in a world of significant digital divides and social 
inequalities. Thus, survival in the pandemic but also the opportunity for the transition 
of the public sphere depends on the availability of digital media and the space therein 
for public experimentation.
5. Conclusion
Our study analysed the forms and dynamics of public sphere resilience and assessed the 
role of digitalisation and digital spaces in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. We were 
able to show that the adaptation of existing practices and the relocation of actions into 
the digital space are recurring modes of resilience which can be observed across different 
sectors of society, such as the economy, civil society, and the media. We also showed 
that resilience practices are dynamic and context dependent, as spelled out with respect 
to the interplay between politicisation and depoliticisation, and between resilience and 
resistance. Our paper wishes to start the discussion of citizens’ resilience as a neglected 
field of public sphere research. Among further aspects to address in subsequent research 
are questions of the diversity of actors engaged in resilience practices (who participates 
and who is left behind), the question of the scope of the emerging digital communica-
tion spaces in relation to a global pandemic, and the question to what extent and under 
which circumstances different modes of resilience and evolving practices contribute to 
the integrative and deliberative functions associated with public spheres.
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